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This paper presents new stylized facts on the distribution of the home bias at the fund level. We find
(i) a large heterogeneity in the degree of home bias across mutual funds; (ii) a positive correlation
between the size of funds and home bias; and (iii) a positive correlation between the size of funds,
the number of foreign countries and the number of sectors in which they invest. These facts constitute













hrey@london.eduIn their classic 1991 paper, Kenneth French and James Poterba pointed out that the
degree of diversiﬁcation in international equity markets was very low. Their estimates of
the domestic ownership shares of the US, Japan, the UK, Germany and France were 92.2%,
95.7%, 79% and 89.4% respectively for end 1989 holdings. Since then, so many papers have
attempted to explain the phenomenon of home bias in developed equity markets that it is
impossible here to give justice to all of them1. Models based on proportional transaction
costs or capital controls have been dismissed early on, since they are hard to square with
the high turnover in international equities (Linda Tesar and Ingrid Werner 1996); as have
explanations based on institutional constraints, since whenever these exist, they do not
appear to be binding (French and Poterba 1991). Deviations from purchasing power parity
and inﬂation risk do not seem to be quantitatively important enough (Ian Cooper and Evi
Kaplanis 1994). Transport costs may explain home bias in some settings (Maurice Obstfeld
and Kenneth Rogoﬀ 2000, Philip Lane and Gian-Maria Milesi-Ferretti 2007), or may have to
be complemented with transaction costs on asset markets (Nicolas Coeurdacier 2006). Since
gross international equity ﬂows and holdings follow a gravity model (Richard Portes and
H´ el` ene Rey 2005), a strand of literature has emphasized familiarity eﬀects or information
costs to explain home bias. Models of rational inattention generate home bias when domestic
investors have a small informational advantage on domestic assets (Laura Veldkamp and Stijn
Van Nieuwerburgh 2006). The interaction of rational inattention and liberalization of capital
markets can reproduce the time series of slightly declining home bias (Jordi Mondria and
1See Karen Lewis 1999 for a survey. We use the term home bias to denote the low degree of foreign
holdings in portfolios. We do not take a stand regarding whether this low degree of diversiﬁcation is due to
frictions or is consistent with a frictionless environment and perfect risk sharing.
1Thomas Wu 2006).
If returns on labour and on domestic equity were negatively correlated, home bias in
equity could be consistent with perfect risk sharing. But introducing human capital in a
one-good two-country model does not help, since its returns tend to be positively correlated
with physical capital in the presence of productivity shocks (Marianne Baxter and Urban
Jermann 1997)2. Harold Cole and Maurice Obstfeld 1991 show that in a two-good endowment
economy terms of trade eﬀects can insure against changes in relative endowments. In the case
of log preferences, they enable perfect risk sharing, even under ﬁnancial autarky. Jonathan
Heathcote and Fabrizio Perri 2007 extend the argument to a two-good open economy with
production and ﬁnd that terms of trade eﬀects operating on the price of capital generate
a negative correlation between relative returns on labour and on domestic equity. Goods
market price stickiness can also generate a negative correlation between labour income and
proﬁts (Charles Engel and Akito Matsumoto 2006). All these theories aim at explaining the
extent of home bias at the country level; in that sense, they are all theories of aggregate
home bias. In this paper, we believe we are the ﬁrst to present stylized facts on home bias at
the fund level. In doing so, we have three goals. First we document the investment behavior
of mutual equity funds; since they are important actors in international markets, this is
interesting in its own right. Second, our data have the advantage that, unlike most of the
literature, they are not US centric. Thus, we have more robust stylized facts, since the US
may be a very special market. Third, we document patterns of heterogeneity in the degree
2Laura Bottazzi, Paolo Pesenti and Eric Van Wincoop 1996 ﬁnd that additional sources of risk can
overturn this result.
2of home bias at the microeconomic level. These patterns could help discriminate between
the various theories of aggregate home bias described above.
I. Fund Level Data
We employ a data set on global equity holdings created by Thomson Financial Securities
(TFS) that contains detailed mutual fund equity holdings worldwide. The data document
holdings of individual mutual funds at the stock level. Similar data have been previously
used by Kalok Chan, Vicentiu Covrig and Lilian Ng 2005 for the years 1999 and 2000. Our
own data set covers the six year period 1997 to 2002. Chan et al. perform a detailed study of
the determinants of investment shares in domestic and foreign markets, aggregating mutual
fund investments country by country. In contrast, we focus on the heterogeneity of the
distribution of home bias across funds. In our data set, some funds report quarterly but
most funds report only with a frequency of 6 months. Thus, we undertake our analysis at
the semester frequency. We focus on funds incorporated in the most developed ﬁnancial
markets where we have a very substantial cross-section of mutual funds, namely the 16
following countries: the United States (US), Canada (CA), United Kingdom (UK), euro
area countries (EU)3 and Switzerland (SWZ). We keep all the 96 investment markets of the
data set. These include several oﬀ-shore centers and emerging markets. Several ﬁlters were
applied to eliminate data outliers. Funds with less than 10 million U.S. Dollars of total
asset value in any semester are discarded. These might represent incubator funds and other
3Ireland, Finland, France, Greece, Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Spain.
3non-representative entities. Stocks are eliminated from the fund portfolio if their total return
index increases by more than 500% or decreases by more than −90%.
Our data are extremely disaggregated and cover many diﬀerent countries. The drawback
is that they only contain information on mutual funds and not on individual investors or
on other types of institutional investors. In our sample we have 11,129 fund-semester ob-
servations in our 16 countries. In order to gauge the representativeness of our data at the
macroeconomic level, we compare them to the best aggregate data available on international
investment, that of the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the IMF4.C P I S
data are available on an annual basis since 2001. The correlations of our holdings with the
CPIS geographical distribution of cross border equity holdings are very high: 0.73 for the
Euro area, 0.93 for the US, 0.99 for Canada, 0.52 for Switzerland, and 0.95 for the UK5.
These high correlations suggests that, as far as the geographical dispersion of holdings is
concerned, our sample is representative of foreign equity positions in the world economy.
Next, we document the summary statistics for our mutual funds holdings data. In Table 1,
we report the number of funds-semester per country over the period 1998-2002, the number of
equity positions and their market value in $bn. For example, for the Euro area, we have 3,804
funds and 310,726 positions valued at around $353 bn. The largest cross-section we have is
for the US with 5,123 equity funds-semester. In Table 2, we present total investment over the
period 1998-2002 by country of fund origin and by destination market. Advanced economies
4One drawback of the CPIS data is that it does not preclude equity investments in mutual funds, hence
indirect holdings of foreign equity.
5These correlations have been computed on foreign holdings only and do not include zeros. Adding
investments into the domestic markets would push these correlations even higher. We report the smallest
correlation for the two years 2001 and 2002.
4invest mostly in other advancede c o n o m i e s .T h ei n t e g r a t i o no ft h eU Sa n dC a n a d i a nm a r k e t
is very high, as expected. In each of our countries, there is a non-negligible number of pure
international funds: 249 in the US (5%), 100 in Canada (16%), 281 in the UK (24%), 280
in the EU (7%); 108 in Switzerland (29%).
Table 1: Summary Statistics on Fund Holdings 1998-2002
Fund in: US CA UK EU SWZ
Funds 5,123 643 1,186 3804 373
Positions 800,339 57,003 140,523 310,726 40,302
Value 2,851 111 252 353 80
Note: Authors’ calculations based on TFS data. We report the number of funds,
of stock positions, and the corresponding asset value (in $billion).
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Investment Destination (1998-2002)
Fund in: US CA UK EU SWZ
US 2,4 5 13 33 96 21 8
CA 37 62 2 1 1
UK 82 4 124 45 6
EU 110 5 53 200 18
SWZ 22 1 10 18 17
O t h e r 1 4 9 64 72 72 0
Note: We report the investment value by investment market (in $billion).
5II. Aggregate Measures of Home Bias
We estimate the aggregate degree of home bias for each country of incorporation of
the funds. To do so, we compute the total market capitalization of the domestic assets in
which funds invest and divide it by their total investment portfolio. We call this measure
the “aggregate mutual fund home bias”. We compare this measure to the home bias given
by aggregate data. We use the CPIS data (available from 2001) on cross-border holdings
and market capitalization data of the F´ ed´ eration Internationale des Bourses de Valeurs to
estimate total investment in the domestic market by domestic agents. We then simply
divide it by the total domestic market capitalization6. Results are shown in Table 3 where
we report the average home bias in 2001-2002. It is clear that equity mutual funds tend to
be less home biased than other investors. The relative pattern of home bias across countries,
however, is similar to the one of the aggregate data. Just like for international trade in
goods, large countries tend to be more closed than smaller ones. Several theories outlined in
the introduction can account for this fact (for example Heathcote and Perri 2007 or Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ 2000). The US exhibits the highest degree of home bias. Our UK and Swiss
sample of mutual funds exhibit considerably less home bias than other investors. There is a
slight decrease in the degree of home bias for all countries between 2001 and 2002.
6We choose not to normalize our numbers by the relative size of the domestic capitalization in the world
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Figure 1: Authors’ calculations based on TFS Data.
Table 3: Aggregate Measures of Home Bias (average 2001-2002)
Fund in: US CA UK EU SWZ
Measures (percent)
Aggregate data 92.18 3 .76 5 .45 5 .46 5 .3
Agg. Mutual Fund 85.17 1 .22 2 .84 4 .02 0 .4
Note: Authors’ calculations based on TFS, CPIS and FIBV data.
7III. Home Bias at the Fund Level
In Table 4, we present data on the average degree of home bias at the fund level for
the period 1998-2002. There is considerable heterogeneity both across countries and across
funds within a country regarding the degree of home bias. A typical equity fund exhibits a
degree of home bias which is not as pronounced as in aggregate data. For the US, the mean
degree of home bias at the fund level is 68.1%, which is much smaller than the aggregate
degree of home bias. For the UK and the Euro area the mean home biases are low: 32.4%
and 29.1%, respectively. The distribution of the degree of home bias at the fund level is very
bimodal. There is a peak of the distribution for pure international equity funds (0 degree of
home bias) and another peak with funds which are totally home biased (see Figure 1). The
distribution in between these two peaks is more regular. We can disaggregate these data by
size of funds. In Figure 2, we show the distribution of (log) fund sizes in our sample. Recall
that we ﬁltered out those funds whose market capitalization is smaller than $10 million. In
all countries (except the UK and Switzerland), bigger funds tend to be more home biased.
In our sample, the mean of a fund market capitalization is 4.33 $bn (median $0.63bn) if its
degree of home bias is bigger than 80%, whereas its mean is only 0.67$bn (median $0.07bn)
if its degree of home bias is smaller than 20%. Furthermore, for intermediate degrees of
home bias (higher than 20% and smaller than 80%), the degree of home bias tends to be
positively correlated with the size of funds. This is why the mean degree of home bias at
the fund level is smaller than the aggregate mutual fund home bias (except for the UK and
Switzerland for which our sample seems biased towards the more international funds).
8Table 4: Summary Statistics on Fund Level Home Bias (1998-2002)
Fund in: US UK EU CA SWZ
HB C HB C HB C HB C HB C
mean 68.1% 8.6 32.4% 11.6 29.1% 9.3 55.2% 7.4 34.6% 10.3
m i n 0 00 00 00 00 0
max 100 57 100 55 100 54 100 54 100 52
Note: We report statistics on fund level home bias (HB) and the number of foreign countries (C)
in which funds invest.
We can also investigate in how many diﬀerent foreign countries and diﬀerent sectors of
activity these funds invest. US funds invest on average in 8.6 diﬀerent countries (the most
internationalized fund investing in 57 countries) and in 5.3 diﬀerent sectors (the most diver-
siﬁed fund investing in 26 sectors). UK funds invest on average in 11.6 countries (maximum
55 countries) and in 6.48 sectors, EU funds in 9.3 countries (maximum 54 countries) and
6.2 sectors7. There is a strong positive correlation between the number of sectors and the
number of countries funds invest in. In our sample, the correlation between the number of
sectors and the number of foreign countries in which funds invest is 0.87. And interestingly,
in all our countries larger funds tend to invest in more foreign economies and in more sectors.
Regressing the (log) fund size on the (log) number of countries (respectively the (log) number
of sectors) gives a strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of 0.11 (respectively 0.07) for the US. The
coeﬃcients were similar and signiﬁcant for all countries except Switzerland8. This strong
7T h en u m b e ro fs e c t o r si sn o tr e p o r t e di nT a b l e4d u et ot h el a c ko fs p a c e .
8We included time dummies in all the regressions. These results are not reported due to lack of space.
9heterogeneity in investment strategies, which correlates with the size of funds, is a challenge
for existing theories. One could argue that fund managers are only intermediaries and that,
ultimately, only the portfolio of households matter. It could be that households invest in
diﬀerent funds, some domestic, some international, some partly diversiﬁed and that, in ﬁne,
household portfolios can be well represented by one or several of the aggregate representative
agent theories outlined in the introduction. Although we have no systematic data to bear on
this question, anecdotal or related evidence on limited participation in stock markets would
rather suggest pronounced heterogeneity across households as well. Prima facie,i ti ss t i l l
puzzling to observe that fund managers, whose common goal is presumably to maximize
returns while minimizing risk, could have so widely heterogeneous portfolios, and ones that
vary systematically with the size of their funds. Finally, it could be argued that managers
face heterogeneous institutional constraints which determine the degree of home bias of their
portfolios. It would be surprising, but not impossible, that such constraints lead to a con-
tinuum of diﬀerent degrees of home bias as found in Figure 1. But if such constraints exist
and are binding, they are certainly not exogenous and are likely to come from an agency
problem between investors and fund managers. This agency problem has yet to be modeled.
IV. Theoretical Implications
Theories of home bias need to be compatible with i) considerable heterogeneity in the
degree of home bias across countries and within countries across funds; ii) a limited number
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Figure 2: Authors’ calculations based on TFS Data.
11correlation between the size of funds and the number of countries in which funds invest
as well as with the number of sectors of activity in which funds invest; and v) a positive
correlation between the degree of home bias and the size of funds (except in our UK and
Swiss sample which seem overweighted in very international funds). Ideally, theories of home
bias should also be compatible with the empirical evidence linking equity prices, exchange
rates and equity ﬂows (Harald Hau and H´ el` ene Rey 2006). They should also be consistent
with the dynamic trading strategies of international equity funds we uncover in another
paper using the same data set (Harald Hau and H´ el` ene Rey 2007). We ﬁnd strong evidence
in favour of portfolio rebalancing strategies out of foreign equities when the foreign equity
weight unexpectedly increases in funds portfolios. Fund managers sell foreign equity and
buy domestic equity when the return on the foreign part of their portfolio outperforms the
return on the domestic part of their portfolio, and vice versa. We believe that these stylized
facts still constitute a challenge for existing theories.
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